Main points
-China's policy of 'non-intervention' remains its strategic objective. Officials and academics will privately and publically declare their support for the principle.
-However, there is growing recognition that some 'tactical' flexibility is needed in order to respond to the fact that regimes can and do change.
-China's engagement with opposition movements in conflict with the state is one such example of 'tactical' flexibility, as previously the country dealt only with the ruling authorities.
-Nonetheless, the change is evolutionary, not revolutionary, and will not yet materially change the Middle East's outlook, or result in China abandoning its strategic policy of nonintervention.
-China's domestic interests remain central to the country's foreign policy and, in the Middle East, are best served by support for existing regimes.
-Europe must engage with change through multiple Chinese actors, while dampening expectations for significant short-term results.
Background Briefing: The Impact of the Arab Revolutions on China's Foreign Policy
Introduction
The Arab revolutions have presented a serious test for China's foreign policy at a time when the country is facing some of its greatest domestic challenges for nearly two decades: a leadership change as the fifth generation of leaders takes power; internal party tensions with the fall of Politburo member Bo Xilai; and risks from an economy that is increasingly reliant on state-owned and heavy industrial-led activity.
However, observing this change is not straightforward to the casual observer. The influences on China's foreign policy are markedly different to those in Europe and the United States -whether the result of China's status as a developing country, its short history as a participant in Middle East politics, its focus on economic security as opposed to political security, or its disinterest in political reforms. This also makes it difficult for Middle East observers to apply the same analytical framework to China's behaviour in the region as that used to understand the behaviour of Europe and the United States.
A good example is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The fact that China has no powerful Israeli lobby (unlike the United States) and no historical obligation to deal with the problem (unlike Europe)
allows China to sit on the sidelines where possible. As a senior Chinese official once privately commented: 'Why should we get involved? Neither side is serious about finding a solution.'
The challenge is compounded by the fact that China's re-engagement with the Middle East is arguably only a decade old and one largely based on commercial relations. There is little published material on the subject and what is available dates relatively quickly. Field research, rather than academic theory, is therefore the more appropriate way to understand the changes taking place.
With that in mind, this paper is written from two perspectives: first, as an Arabic and Chinesespeaking scholar of China's reengagement with the Middle East; second, and arguably more importantly, as a private sector participant in China's strengthening trade and investment relations with the Middle East, focused on acquisition, joint-venture, and capital-raising opportunities between the two.
The Middle East in China's World View
It is popular to assume that the Middle East is a primary focus for China's foreign policy, just as it is for Europe and the United States. However, that is not the case. This might appear counterintuitive given that China's oil imports already account for half of domestic oil consumption, and the share is rising steadily. It is, however, a matter of expediency: China's foreign policy priorities are shaped by the country's still limited foreign policy capabilitiesat least relative to the large developed countriesand the realities of its geography.
The United Statesthe world's major economic and military poweris naturally a primary focus.
Europe is also a focus given the region's similar economic power, albeit more 'diluted' military and political power. Korea, Japan, Russia and Southeast Asia, while individually less important, are still a key focus, whether because of shared borders, commercial relations, or historical disputes. 
An Evolutionary Change in Policy
China's foreign policy stance has evolved in response to the Arab revolutions. The change is evolutionary, not revolutionary, but has important implications.
In private conversations with academics and officials, it is typically argued that China's strategic policy of 'non-intervention' is unchanged. However, there have been 'tactical' changes in the country's approach to the Middle East. As China's Special Envoy to the Middle East, Wu Sike, argued in an editorial published in the People's Daily in May 2011, 'Non-intervention is not equal to inaction'.
The most important of these changes has been recognition of opposition movements, especially those in armed conflict with the state. The Chinese state has historically avoided dealing with such movements for fear of setting a precedent by which foreign powers might deal with opposition movements in China. Two recent examples in Libya and Syria underscore this change.
In June 2011, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that the Libyan opposition movement was an 'important political force'. This was shortly followed by a visit by Mahmoud Jibril, the Chairman of The problem is relative perception. While these changes were significant to close observers of China's foreign policy, they meant little to Libyans and Syrians using Europe and the United States as their foreign policy benchmarks. Instead, attention was paid to China's refusal to participate in military action against the Gadhafi regime, or vote against measures raised against Syria at the United Nations Security Council.
As a reflection of this, China has anecdotally found it difficult to restore commercial relations with
Libya. There is anecdotal evidence from Libya whereby officials have refused outright to deal with
Chinese firms (and Indian, for that matter), a major concern for those firms wanting to return to the country. (That said, this stance depends on individual cases, and the extent to which Libya has alternatives to Chinese firms.)
The irony is that China's relations with the previous regime were in fact relatively weak. Indeed, the 
China's Commercial Interests in the Middle East

Oil Interests
China prioritises its own economic stability as the best means of safeguarding its social and therefore political stability. This belief was central to a massive policy stimulus made in response to the global crisis. It also influences China's engagement with the rest of the world, especially the large commodity producers concentrated in the developing world.
This suggests that China should prioritise its reliance on oil imports from the Middle East. China's domestic oil production has largely peaked, and marginal increases in consumption are supplied by imports. The Middle East is already supplying 52% of China's oil imports and 28% of total oil consumption, a figure that is forecast to rise gradually in the coming years. To put that in perspective, United States in the early 2000s, shortly before the second Gulf War.
The disruption to Libya's oil supply was a warning signal of the potential risks to China. Libya supplied 3% of China's total oil imports pre-revolution, implying a physical disruption to supplies, alongside a price disruption as international oil prices soared to around $100 a barrel. The rise in prices compressed profit margins among Chinese manufacturers and drove gasoline prices higher for the middle-class. That noted, the Arab revolutions have not resulted in a material disruption to supply: together, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen were worth 5% of China's total imports prerevolution.
The bigger challenge for China then is potential conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Together, the two supply 31% of China's total oil imports, not including the exports from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that would be disrupted in the event that oil tankers are prevented from travelling through the Strait of Hormuz. China has unsurprisingly remained reluctant to take sides in cross-straits disputes for fear of antagonising either party. The reports are unsubstantiated and may be fabrications of the Syrian opposition, but they do reflect the growing ties made in the Middle East between the region's oil exports to China and the latter's growing importance to the Middle East's politics. It would not be a surprise to see such pressure grow in the long-term, especially in the event of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Still, oil supply and prices, while at risk, have not yet been dislocated to the extent that China's foreign policy towards the region might change significantly.
Non-Oil Interests
China's non-oil commercial relations with the Middle East have meanwhile flourished since the early 2000s, but are not yet motivation for the country to take a more activist position in the region.
First, the magnitude of trade with the Middle East, while growing, still accounts for less than 4% of China's total exports. This is similar to its exports to Africa (4%) and modestly smaller than exports to Latin America (6%). It is thus not significant enough to represent a material risk to China's export sector and social stability in the event that the region's export demand collapsed. 
China's Domestic Policies
China's domestic politics are a further restraint on the country's ability, and willingness, to act more decisively in response to the Arab revolutions, albeit a restraint that is often overlooked.
China's economy has reached an inflection point as imbalances in the composition of growth builtup over the past decade, but especially since 2008, have raised the risks of a sudden slowdown in growth. Coupled with worsening income inequalities, whether because of slow real income growth or rising food and house prices, this has raised the threat of serious social unrest.
Many of the complaints made by Middle East protestors about living costs and corruption thus resonated in China, and there was some fear among China's senior leadership of a spillover revolt. 
Implications for Europe
China's policy of 'non-intervention' remains in force. However, there has been a 'tactical' change in the country's approach to the Middle East. Whether that change is material enough to change the trajectory of other countries, or Europe's interests in those countries, is still far from clear. So far, the evidence from Libya and Syria is 'no'. Nonetheless, the change is sufficient to require a response.
With this in mind, a few points can be made with respect to Europe's engagement of China in the Middle East.
-China's engagement with opposition forces is not conducted for the same purpose as that of Europe and the United States, for example, support for the principles of a multi-party democratic political system. It instead reflects a growing recognition that political regimes can and do change and so, opening dialogue with opposition movements in conflict with the state is a pragmatic means of hedging against this risk.
-China will rightly worry that as long as Europe and the United States lobby more aggressively for regime change, they will be the greater beneficiary from such change. This discourages
China from taking a more assertive stance in support of opposition movements in conflict with the state, as the benefits from such a stance are unclear, unless international opinion has firmly swung against the ruling regime (as in the case of Libya).
-China's domestic interests remain primary when considering the country's actions in the Middle East. Most important is China's economic security, especially its growing reliance on oil imports. To this end, the stability of existing regimes best serves China's interests, especially given that intervention by Europe and the United States over the past decades have yielded limited results.
-Observers should be cautious about reading too much into small shifts in China's policy towards the region. The fact that its policy is a residual of China's interests in the rest of the world; the fact it has a shortage of Middle East expertise; and that the bulk of China's commercial interests are in the Gulf and largely unaffected, means policy changes so far are partly opportunistic and not necessarily a good guide to future behaviour.
-Europe should engage China's tactical adjustment in its foreign policy stance towards the Middle East. However, Europe should expect only a gradual evolution, rather than revolution, in policy. Forcing a faster pace of change is unlikely to yield results.
-First, and as a general rule, engaging with China through multiple parties is critical, in part owing to the diffuse nature of China's Middle East policies, but also the country's increasingly consensus-driven rule. Engaging through non-public means is also important, to avoid putting officials or academics in the awkward position of conflicting with state policy and so ensuring healthy debate between all sides.
-Second, China is increasingly keen on being viewed as a responsible global power. This may tempt its leadership to play a more active role in the region given the importance of the Middle East to all the world's major powers. Europe should consider establishing whether China might join a group such as the Quartet on the Middle East; however, in the author's view, the chances of acceptance are small.
Indeed, pragmatism will remain China's guiding rule, especially in a region where there are so many competing strategic powers (Europe, the US, Russia, Turkey, Israel and Iran). And, as long as China's interests remain mercantilist, trying to balance commercial relations with Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia will further restrain the country's ability to take a more public position.
-Third, engaging China as a partner in plans for economic aid or post-conflict reconstruction would demonstrate that Europe's support for regime change is not an attempt to squeeze
China's economic interests in the Middle East (a popular fear in China). It would also better suit China's interests to engage at an economic, rather than political, level, and so maintain its strategic policy of 'non-intervention'.
That noted, it would be better to divide priorities so that China can at least appear to be acting independently of Europe, rather than propose joint-aid programs. To illustrate, the China Development Bank might make a direct loan to Egypt for highway construction, albeit after having coordinated with other European development banks on a list of construction priorities.
-Fourth, working with China's major oil suppliers, especially Saudi Arabia, as an indirect form of lobbying. This is especially important on the issues related to Syria and Iran, as Europe and Saudi Arabia share a similar stance on these two countries. It might be that such pressure is later publicly realised through the cover of the Arab League, but discrete bilateral lobbying through China's oil suppliers is the more immediately effective approach.
However, it is important to point out that Saudi Arabia's interest in lobbying China aggressively is weakened by the fact that Saudi Arabia is as dependent on China's oil demand as China is dependent on Saudi Arabia's oil supply. This 'co-dependency' is strengthened by the fact the two sides are ideal partners in so far they both have a preference for long-term oil contracts made between producers and final users.
-Finally, when observing China's changing foreign policy towards the Middle East, events in Syria are more important than those in Libya, owing to the greater complexities of the
